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NONPUBLIC REASONS AND POLITICAL 
PARADIGM CHANGE 
IAN BARTRUM† 
INTRODUCTION 
John Rawls has famously argued that citizens in a just 
democracy have a moral duty to ensure that “the principles and 
policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the 
political values of public reason.”1  This so-called “duty of civility” 
obligates us to cast our votes on “ ‘constitutional essentials’ and 
questions of basic justice” for reasons that we can explain in 
terms of the public good and the “ideals and principles expressed 
by society’s conception of political justice.”2  Rawls contrasts 
these public reasons with “nonpublic reasons”—such as 
“comprehensive religious [and] philosophical doctrine[s]”—which 
he claims cannot legitimize acts of political coercion.3  Yet, our 
Constitution singles out and protects certain paradigmatic kinds 
of nonpublic reasons, at least in the private sphere, and arguably 
in the political sphere as well.  This Article attempts to justify 
these constitutional protections by offering a structural account 
of the essential role that nonpublic reasons play in the progress 
and evolution of a liberal democratic state.  Many thoughtful and 
influential scholars—Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Michael Walzer, Jeremy Waldron, and Michael Sandel, to name 
just a few—have written on the place of nonpublic reasons in  
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Law School on November 5, 2010 for their insight and comments. Thanks also to 
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1 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1993). 
2 Id. at 213, 214, 217. 
3 Id. at 220–23. 
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democratic debate, and Kent Greenawalt has devoted two entire 
books to the subject.4  However, none of them have advanced, at 
least directly, the arguments in this Article.   
Most attempts to justify the place of nonpublic reasoning in 
political discourse proceed along deontological lines.  That is, 
these efforts ground the claim to constitutional protection in the 
primacy of religious duties or obligations and suggest that we 
must treat religiously minded people as autonomous ends in 
themselves.  This is hardly surprising, because these are the very 
reasons that motivated the framers to enshrine the Test Oath 
and Free Exercise Clauses in the constitutional text.  This may 
also explain why Rawls framed his objections to non-public 
reasoning in the language of deontology5:  After all, it is hardly a 
satisfying objection to a deontological claim to suggest that 
renouncing a duty would produce more efficient results.  This 
Article contends, however, that—despite the deontological 
veneer—Rawls’s proposed exclusion of nonpublic reasons is 
actually grounded in consequentalist arguments about the types 
of debate and discourse that will produce the best kind of 
democracy. 
It is, in part, this crossing of deontological and 
consequentalist wires that has made the debate over nonpublic 
reasoning appear so intractable.  The competing arguments often 
seem to speak in incommensurable terms, with one side claiming 
the privilege of absolute right and the other extolling the 
democracy promoting virtues of productive civil discourse.  This 
Article confronts Rawls’s argument on its own consequentalist 
ground.  Although the discussion of the religion clauses begins 
with a brief exploration of the intellectual history that roots the 
text in deontological appeals to religious duty and individual 
autonomy, in the end it provides an alternative, consequential 
account of the reasons why we should continue to protect 
nonpublic reasoning in our political discourse and voting.  In this 
way, this Article offers a reply to Rawls’s position that does not 
 
4 See generally KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC 
REASONS (1995) [hereinafter PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]; KENT GREENAWALT, 
RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988). 
5 Deontology, often contrasted with consequentialism or utilitarianism, provides 
an account of “moral” reasoning and behavior rooted in a priori duties that we must 
fulfill no matter the consequences. Rawls often grounded his claims about basic 
political fairness in deontological reasons, and so his arguments about the “duty” to 
provide public reasons may simply be an effort to remain consistent in this regard. 
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simply talk past his premises by presenting deontological 
objections to a consequentalist claim.  Ultimately, of course, any 
competing consequential claims must be assessed against our 
political experience, but hopefully this account points out a 
productive avenue for future empirical work. 
The first Part of this Article discusses the historical 
conception of the liberty of conscience, argues that this idea was 
the central theoretical justification for the religion clauses at the 
time of the founding, and suggests that we can plausibly read the 
constitutional text as protecting the right to debate and vote for 
nonpublic reasons.  Part II sketches Rawls’s arguments and 
argues that—the language of duty notwithstanding—these 
arguments basically appeal to consequentalist kinds of reasons.  
It then presents an original structural account of the value of 
nonpublic reasons in political discourse, and looks to both 
Thomas Kuhn and the theory of natural selection as illustrative 
analogs.  The third and final Part briefly recounts the New York 
City Catholic schools controversy as a historical example of a 
productive political interaction between public and nonpublic 
reasoning. 
I. THE LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
Perhaps the most influential recent account of the central 
role that the liberty of conscience played in the history of the 
religion clauses is that which Noah Feldman gave in his 2002 
article The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause.6  
While Feldman is particularly persuasive, he is hardly alone in 
recognizing the importance that many of the Constitution’s 
principal framers and advocates placed on the rights of 
conscience.7  It seems fairly clear to most observers that the 
constitutional language embodied at least some of the rich  
 
 
 
 
 
6 Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002). 
7 See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); John 
Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American 
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, (1996). 
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heritage of theological and philosophical thought that had 
absorbed Europe in the centuries leading up to American 
colonization.8 
If we believe Feldman, both James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson inherited an intellectual tradition that traces its 
lineage from Thomas Aquinas, through Martin Luther, John 
Calvin, William Perkins, Roger Williams and the dissenting 
Baptists in New England, and on to John Locke.9  This tradition 
began with Aquinas’s thoughts about individual human beings’ 
innate ability to comprehend good and bad as reflected in the 
natural law,10 and would later form the basis for Luther’s 
revolutionary defiance of Papal authority:  “I am bound by the 
Scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the 
word of God.  I cannot and I will not retract anything, since it is 
neither safe nor right to go against conscience.”11  Thus, it is with 
Luther, and Calvin immediately thereafter, that the definitively 
Protestant conception of an individual conscience that imposes 
duties upon us prior to any civil or ecclesiastical authority was 
born.12 
It was through Calvin that the liberty of conscience made its 
way into the English Puritan world, and was then later carried 
on to New England.13  Indeed, despite their notorious intolerance 
in the New World, the Puritans included in the famous 
Westminster Confession a chapter entitled “Of Christian Liberty, 
and Liberty of Conscience,”14 which topic would be the source of a 
heated public dispute between Boston minister John Cotton and 
Rhode Island’s Roger Williams.15  Williams accused Cotton of 
opposing the liberty of conscience.  In reply Cotton claimed to 
have no problem with a conscience “rightly informed,” but argued 
that civil authorities must step in to provide corrective 
 
8 See Feldman, supra note 6, at 353–54. 
9 Id. at 354–55, 362, 374–78. 
10 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 1, at 1008 
(Benziger Bros., Inc. ed. 1947) (1266–1273) (“Synderesis [conscience] is said to be the 
law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, 
which are the first principles of human actions.”). 
11 Feldman, supra note 6, at 358.  
12 See id. at 359–61. 
13 Id. at 359. 
14 WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY, THE CONFESSION OF FAITH, AND THE LARGER AND 
SHORTER CATECHISMS 31 (Majestic Printers, 1711) (1647).  
15 Feldman, supra note 6, at 365. 
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punishment for those suffering from “erroneous” consciences.16  
Williams, not surprisingly, found this to be a distinction without 
a difference, and argued instead for the kind of religious 
toleration that would form the backbone of Locke’s famous letter 
on religious freedom.17 
Writing from de facto exile in Holland, Locke made the case 
that civil government enjoys very limited jurisdiction over the 
religious life of its subjects and certainly has no authority to 
“compel any one to his religion.”18  According to Locke’s reading of 
Scripture, God had never delegated such a power to the civil 
authority, and, as a consequence, must have retained in himself 
sole jurisdiction over matters of religion and faith.19  From this 
premise, Locke argued that a civil government that attempts to 
compel a subject against the dictates of conscience—that innate 
knowledge of natural law—actually enforces a kind of hypocrisy 
of action against belief, and in this way commits an affront 
against God.20  Thus, Locke concluded that, even if the state 
could produce certain behavior or action in citizens, this “would 
not . . . help at all to the salvation of their souls,” and thus, “when 
all is done, they must be left to their own consciences.”21  And it 
was very much this Lockean conception of the liberty of 
conscience, filtered through a generation of Baptist and 
Congregationalist struggles in the northern colonies, that 
informed Madison’s and Jefferson’s views in post-revolutionary 
Virginia.22 
Jefferson began the Lockean thrust with his 1779 Virginia 
Statute of Religious Freedom, in which he made two interrelated 
arguments in support of the rights of conscience: (1) civil 
lawmakers are incompetent to evaluate religious truth; and (2) a 
true religion thrives without coercion.23  Jefferson’s statute did 
 
16 Id. at 365–66. 
17 Id. at 366. 
18 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), reprinted in 35 GREAT 
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 3 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1952). 
19 Id.; accord Feldman, supra note 6, at 368. 
20 Locke, supra note 18; accord Ian Bartrum, Paradise Lost: Good News, 
Charitable Choice, and the State of Religious Freedom, 27 VT. L. REV. 177, 182 
(2002). 
21 Locke, supra note 18, at 4, 10. 
22 Feldman, supra note 6, at 381–83. 
23 Thomas Jefferson, The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom (1779), reprinted 
in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WORD FOR WORD 55, 55–57 (Maureen Harrison & Steve 
Gilbert eds., 1993). 
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not immediately pass the Virginia Assembly, however, and in 
1784 Patrick Henry introduced his own legislation intended to 
remedy a perceived decay in public morality.24  Henry sought 
statutory support for a program of religious assessments to pay 
Anglican teachers around the Commonwealth, and though 
Jefferson was on his way to Paris, Madison took up the flag and 
offered a principled objection to the bill.25  In a hastily distributed 
pamphlet entitled Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments, Madison undertook a vigorous defense of Jefferson’s 
views.26  In truth, Madison’s approach was something of a 
scattershot broadside—he mustered any plausible argument he 
could against Henry’s proposal—but the core of his objections 
recalled Locke’s liberty of conscience:  Civil jurisdiction is limited 
and does not touch the “conscience of every man,” and state 
attempts at coercion amount to “an offence against God, not 
against man.”27  Ultimately, Madison’s case was persuasive, and 
six years after its drafting, Jefferson’s statute of religious 
freedom became law in the place of Henry’s assessment bill.28 
It seems very likely indeed that these same ideas informed 
Madison’s thinking as he drafted and defended the Free Exercise 
Clause as a member of the First Congress.29  Though the precise 
record of congressional debate on the clause is quite limited, 
Madison did clearly say that he understood the language to 
prohibit Congress from “compel[ling] men to worship God in any 
manner contrary to their conscience.”30  This certainly seemed to 
be the hope of many concerned parties during the ratification 
 
24 Bartrum, supra note 20, at 186. 
25 See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments (1785), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 7, 7–8 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973) 
[hereinafter MIND OF THE FOUNDER]. 
26 Id. at 8. 
27 Feldman, supra note 6, at 383–84 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 
(1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 300, 300 (Robert A. Rutland 
& William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973)). 
28 See MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 25, at 8. 
29 The Establishment Clause is another matter entirely. For a persuasive 
account of that clause’s original import, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 42–45 (1998). 
30 House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution (Aug. 15, 1789) 
(comments of Madison), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 92, 93 (Philip 
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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debates that took place the preceding year.31  The Virginia 
Ratifying Convention thus proposed an amendment to protect 
“the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of 
conscience,”32 and during the North Carolina debates Henry 
Abbot expressed his concern that the proposed Constitution did 
not guarantee citizens “the privilege of worshipping God 
according to their consciences.”33  In short, the Free Exercise 
Clause that the ratifying states demanded, and which Madison 
intended to provide, was one grounded in the intellectual 
tradition that had grown up around the liberty of conscience. 
These same sentiments characterize the ratification debates 
surrounding the Test Oath Clause, which prohibits any religious 
test for federal office, included in Article VI of the original text.34  
Again, the material on the actual drafting of the clause is limited:  
It was added with very little debate near the end of the 
convention at Madison’s urging—with some slight modification 
by Charles Pinkney and Gouvernor Morris35—and the only brief 
objection came from Roger Sherman, who thought it unnecessary 
given the “prevailing liberality” of the times.36  But, as with the 
Free Exercise Clause, the intellectual motivations are made 
clearer in the ratification debates.  Oliver Ellsworth probably 
shed the most light on the question in Connecticut, where the 
established congregationalists saw the Test Oath Clause as a 
concession to the dissenting Baptists, and thus worried that the 
language was hostile to organized religion.37  Ellsworth argued 
that, on the contrary, the clause was meant to “exclude 
persecution, and to secure to you the important right of religious 
liberty,” a liberty which he defined as every man’s “right to 
worship God in that way which is most agreeable to his 
 
31 See generally Virginia Ratifying Convention, Proposed Amendments (June 27, 
1788), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 89, 89; Debate 
in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 30, 1788) (cmts. of Henry Abbot), 
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 89, 89. 
32 Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 31. 
33 Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention, supra note 31. 
34 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
35 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 30, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 475, 461 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
36 Id. at 468.  
37 Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 639, 640–41 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
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conscience.”38  Ellsworth in Connecticut was not alone:  Tench 
Coxe in Pennsylvania argued that with the clause, the 
government had “divested itself of a power, every exercise of 
which is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven,”39 and Reverend 
Samuel Payson told the Massachusetts ratifying convention that 
“human tribunals for the consciences of men are impious 
encroachments upon the prerogatives of God.”40  It seems then 
that the same protection of conscience which the Free Exercise 
Clause promised to citizens in 1789, the Test Oath Clause had 
already extended to federal legislators in 1787. 
Once we have established that these provisions of the 
constitutional text came into being to protect individual 
conscience and the duties it imposes against the coercive power of 
the state, it is not too great a leap to conclude that the text must 
also protect our right to deliberate and cast votes for 
paradigmatically nonpublic kinds of reasons.  It is, after all, in 
matters of great political controversy and import that this 
protection may be most needed, and it seems to be precisely the 
problem of enforced heterodoxy or conformity that the 
constitutional text is intended to combat.  It is true, of course, 
that if wielded in certain ways—for what Kent Greenawalt has 
called “imposition” kinds of nonpublic reasons41—the power of the 
vote may in fact work to burden others’ rights of conscience.  But 
it may very well be that this is the very evil that the 
Establishment Clause—at least the substantive version we have 
come to know through the Fourteenth Amendment—aims to 
prevent.  That is, the Free Exercise and Test Oath Clauses exist 
in a kind of dialectic tension with the Establishment Clause:  The 
former clauses guarantee citizens and legislators the right to vote 
with their consciences, while the latter clause ensures that truly 
“imposition” kinds of policies cannot have the force of law.   
At the core of this dialectic, however, remains the  
 
38 Id. at 639. 
39 Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Constitution (1787), reprinted in 4 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 639, 639. 
40 Debate in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan. 30, 1788) (cmts. of 
Mr. Payson), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 642, 
643. 
41 PUBLIC CONSCIENCES, supra note 4, at 57. Greenawalt opposes uses of 
nonpublic reasoning that “impose” burdens on other’s freedom of conscience and/or 
exercise.  He contrasts this with nonpublic reasoning that imposes burdens only on 
the reasoner herself.  
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same fundamental constitutional purpose:  We should protect 
individual conscience against state intrusion precisely because it 
is a source of nonpublic reasons—reasons that we cannot hope to 
protect through the public political process—and because 
conscience imposes deontological duties upon us with which the 
just state should not interfere. 
II. THE “DUTY” OF CIVILITY AND POLITICAL PARADIGM SHIFT 
It is, perhaps, because the constitutional protections 
provided to religious reasoning seem so deeply rooted in 
deontology that Rawls styles his objection to nonpublic reasons in 
political discourse as grounded in a “duty of civility.”42  Indeed, 
Rawls expressly argues that this duty imposes “a moral, not a 
legal” obligation on us,43 and he locates the very idea of “public 
reasons” in the Kantian tradition.44  With this in mind, it is clear 
that Rawls at least claims to justify his proposed exclusion of 
nonpublic reasoning on deontological grounds; that is, he frames 
his argument so as to present an obligation that can compete 
with—and perhaps exclude—other kinds of obligations, including 
those imposed by religion or conscience.  A slightly deeper look at 
Rawls’s—at least original—account, however, suggests that his 
underlying worries about the place of nonpublic reasons in 
political discourse are actually concerns about consequences.  
This becomes clearer when we explore the role that public 
reasoning is supposed to play in bringing about the “[i]deal of 
[d]emocratic [c]itizenship.”45 
Rawls’s ideal citizen exists within an inherited social 
structure, and understands the just exercise of political power as 
the collective will of free and equal citizens.46  With these 
considerations in mind, Rawls contends that the ideal citizen will 
recognize certain “legitimate” grounds for the exercise of coercive 
political power.47  He claims these grounds are those “which all 
citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and 
 
42 RAWLS, supra note 1. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 213 & n.2. 
45 Id. at 216. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 216–17. 
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rational.”48  Thus, as it is “reasonable[ness] and rational[ity]” 
that give rise to political legitimacy, the “ideal” obligates a citizen 
to advocate only those exercises of power she can explain in 
terms of public reasons.49  Significantly, while the ideal may 
impose upon us a duty not to coerce people irrationally, it is not 
clear that this duty carries through and obligates us to base our 
political arguments or votes on public reasons.  Rather, it is only 
because Rawls believes that the right kinds of arguments and 
deliberations—those based in public reasoning—are most likely 
to produce rational—and thus legitimate—exercises of coercion 
that he would exclude nonpublic reasons from the debate.50  It 
might, in fact, be true that the injection of unreasonable and 
irrational arguments into political discourse ends up producing a 
quite reasonable and rational instantiation of political power, 
and if this were the case then the nonpublic reasoner would have 
fulfilled her obligation to the democratic ideal.  But to Rawls this 
seems unlikely, and so it is the probable consequence of nonpublic 
reasoning—its tendency to produce irrational, and thus 
illegitimate, laws—that principally concerns him.51 
Upon close examination, then, we should understand Rawls’s 
objection to nonpublic reasoning itself as grounded in 
consequentalism.  Essentially, his claim is that nonpublic 
reasons are likely to produce the wrong kind of political debate—
one that results in acts of illegitimate political coercion.  At this 
point, this may seem unnecessarily formalistic or to be splitting 
hairs—why should we care if his account is deontological or 
consequentalist at root?  There is actually a good reason to care 
in this case:  If we want to confront Rawls’s claim on its own 
merits and in terms of its own justifications, we need to be clear 
about what those merits and justifications are.  Here, as those 
justifications are consequentalist in nature, it is necessary to 
provide a competing consequentalist account; an account that 
suggests that nonpublic reasoning in public discourse may 
sometimes promote the kinds of political decision making that 
produce the best, or most ideal, democratic results.  And, even if 
this is not true most of the time, the effect of nonpublic reasoning  
 
 
48 Id. at 217. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 215–16. 
51 Id. at 221–22. 
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may be so valuable on those occasions when it does produce good 
results that we are willing to protect its place in all political 
discourse. 
The competing account this Article offers draws on two 
scientific analogies, and, as with most analogies, it is imperfect.  
Nonetheless, these analogies remain useful and productive, and  
hopefully the reader will treat them charitably.  The first analogy 
is to Thomas Kuhn’s theoretical account of scientific revolutions 
rooted in instances of “paradigm change.”52 
A Kuhnian “paradigm change” is a revolutionary moment in 
scientific progress where some insight changes the entire focus 
and object of scientific inquiry in a particular field.53  Typically, 
such an insight follows on the heels of an increase in anomalous 
empirical observations:  Instances where the accepted theoretical 
paradigm cannot predict or explain a particular set of data.54  As 
these anomalies continue to mount, the existing paradigm 
strains to provide a consistent account of the problematic data, 
and eventually the paradigm itself crumbles in the light of a 
fundamental insight that allows for a more comprehensive and 
coherent explanation of the observations.55  There are many 
examples of such revolutionary moments, but perhaps the most 
illustrative is the shift from a Ptolemaic, geocentric paradigm of 
the solar system to the Copernican heliocentric model.  For  
years, astronomers tacked increasingly complex and convoluted 
addenda onto Ptolemy’s basic structure in order to explain 
anomalous observations such as planetary retrograde; but 
eventually the Copernican model—which could account for the 
anomalies quite simply—won over the scientific community.56  
The blinding insight, of course, was simply to move the sun to the 
center of the system. 
For the purposes of this Article, the important point about 
these kinds of insights is that they are not available or 
explainable within the existing paradigm of scientific thought—
 
52 See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
52–53 (3d ed. 1996).  
53 See generally id. at 92–97. 
54 Id. at 52. 
55 Id. 
56 RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND: UNDERSTANDING THE 
IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD 248–51 (First Ballantine Books ed. 1993) 
(1991). 
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they require a thorough recalibration of fundamental premises.57  
Indeed, in comparing paradigm changing insights to political 
revolutions, Kuhn observes, “Though revolutions have had a vital 
role in the evolution of political institutions, that role depends 
upon their being partially extrapolitical or extrainstitutional 
events.”58  Put simply, a paradigm changing insight is, by 
definition, not fully explainable within the structures of the 
existing paradigm.  To analogize this thought to our examination 
of nonpublic reasons, consider that a “duty of civility,” which 
requires us to deliberate and vote only in terms of publicly 
accessible, “overlapping consensus” kinds of reasons, works to 
suppress and subvert the possibility of “paradigm change” kinds 
of moments in political science.59  This is so because it may be 
that a political position is not explainable in terms of existing 
public values and rationales precisely because those values and 
rationales are, in some important way, wrong. 
Concededly, if values and rationales are widely held, they 
are likely to be right—of course, we might at one time have said 
the same thing of Ptolemy’s model of the solar system.  But they 
might not be—in which case dissenters will need to reach for 
something transcendental on which to base their arguments.  
Think, for example, of South Africa, or the American south, and 
racial slavery or segregation.  The existing public reasons in 
those communities were a matter of some debate, but at least  
the dominant kinds of reasons appeared to justify racially 
discriminatory sorts of practices.  It was only by reaching outside 
of those communities—to world opinion, to northern liberal 
opinion, or, indeed, in many cases to religious principles—that 
people within those systems could ground their arguments 
against the existing value structures.  Like a scientific paradigm 
change, which cannot be justified within the existing paradigm, 
deep political innovation sometimes requires a recalibration of 
fundamental assumptions and principles.  And while it may well 
be true that the majority—perhaps even the vast majority—of 
nonpublic reasons for political advocacy will not be productive, 
paradigm changing kinds of insights, these insights are so  
 
 
 
57 See generally KUHN, supra note 52, at 92–94. 
58 Id. at 93–94 (emphasis added). 
59 For the concept of “overlapping consensus,” see RAWLS, supra note 1, at 133.  
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important and valuable when they do come along that we should 
always provide a structural place for nonpublic reasoning at the 
political table. 
The second, shorter, analogy is to the theory of natural 
selection and its role in the evolution of species.  In this analogy, 
nonpublic reasoning fulfills something like the function that 
“mutation” does in Darwin’s model.  Mutation, recall, is the 
engine of design change that drives the selection process 
forward.60  Without some, at least small, leaps forward in 
biological design—leaps that occur for no reason readily 
explainable in terms of the existing biological system—there 
would be no significant design differences for nature to select 
among.  There would be only the status quo.   
But it is also worth remembering Niles Eldredge and 
Stephen Jay Gould’s important contributions to our 
understanding of this process.61  Their landmark paper—which 
supplants the traditional model of “phyletic gradualism” with a 
theory of “punctuated equilibria”—pointed out that Darwin 
viewed the actual fossil record of species “more as an 
embarrassment than as an aid to his theory.”62  This is because 
Darwin’s theory suggested that there should be “infinitely 
numerous transitional links” that would show the slow, steady, 
and gradual process of biological evolution—but the fossil record 
actually reveals long periods of evolutionary stasis, or 
“morphologic stability,” when very limited adaptation seems to 
have occurred.63  Indeed, rather than a steady, gradual process, 
the evidence seems to indicate that biological change happens in 
spurts; what Eldredge and Gould called periods of “punctuated 
equilibria.”64  While Darwin tried to explain this phenomenon 
away as the product of an incomplete evidentiary record,65 
Eldredge and Gould theorized that, although mutations are 
happening all the time, true biological evolution occurs only 
 
60 Ruth Hershberg & Dmitri A. Petrov, Evidence that Mutation Is Universally 
Biased Towards AT in Bacteria, PLOS GENETICS, Sept. 2010, at 1, available at 
http://petrov.stanford.edu/pdfs/73.pdf. 
61 See generally Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An 
Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism, reprinted in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82, 82–
115 (T.J.M. Schopf ed., 1972). 
62 Id. at 87. 
63 See id. at 110. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 87. 
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when there is some change in a local environment that happens 
to benefit a particular change in biological design.66  Thus, the 
periods of punctuated equilibria—those characterized by rapid 
and prevalent evolutionary change67—are precipitated by 
changes in the environment with which the ever-present process 
of mutation may or may not correspond. 
The theory of punctuated equilibria is important to the 
analogy for this reason: it is probably true that the vast majority 
of mutations—in this analogy, the vast majority of nonpublic 
reasons for voting—will not match up with a particular change in 
the democratic environment.  Thus, these mutations will not be 
selected for, and will wither away as do unproductive biological 
mutations.  But some mutations—again, some nonpublic 
reasons—will actually match up with nascent changes in the 
democratic environment in ways that the status quo—existing 
public reasons—could not have done.  It is as a result of these 
mutations that a democracy can reach a state of equilibrium that 
best reflects the actual liberal democratic environment—the 
collective will of free and equal citizens—it is meant to represent.  
By the same mechanism, we are protected against the 
commonplace, counterproductive nonpublic reasons that might 
otherwise threaten democratic stability.  In a Federalist 10 meets 
Origin of Species kind of way, then, our greatest hope for 
meaningful freedom and political stability lies in our willingness 
to give a wide diversity of views a voice in a pluralist political 
structure. 
Hopefully these analogies offer at least some reason to think 
that giving nonpublic reasons a place in our political discourse 
may actually produce good consequences of the kind that move us 
closer to an “ideal” democratic state.  It may, in fact, be true that 
nonpublic reasons are most valuable in political discourse when 
they force us to revise and refine our public reasoning so that it 
better reflects what we believe are its idealistic goals.  Nonpublic 
reasoning’s main value, that is, may be as a foil—a devil’s 
advocate—that helps us better understand the public values and 
overlapping consensus we envision.  A truly compelling 
evaluation of this account will, of course, require real empirical 
evidence; that is, after all, the proper method by which to 
 
66 See id. at 94–95 (“[S]election always maintains an equilibrium between 
populations and their local environment.”). 
67 Id. at 84.  
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evaluate competing consequentalist claims.  At this time,  
however, all this Article can offer is anecdotal evidence; it does so 
below with a very brief account of the controversy over Catholic 
schooling that took place in New York City in the early 1840s. 
III. THE NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL CONTROVERSY 
The roots of the Catholic school controversy in New York 
City actually stretch back well before the 1840s, to the 
beginnings of the “common school” movement in New England 
and the northeastern states.68  That movement, which aimed to 
provide education for all, not just poor, children in the same 
state-funded classrooms, also hoped to use schooling as a vehicle 
by which to ease social tensions and promote a common sense of 
purpose and identity.69  The common school movement began in 
New York City in 1805, when nearly one hundred of the “best 
elements of the old English, Dutch, and other families” petitioned 
the state legislature for incorporation of what they called the 
“Free School Society.”70  By 1813, the Society was receiving New 
York City’s portion of the funds that the state legislature had  
allocated for education.  In 1826 the group changed its name to 
the New York Public School Society (the “Society”) and took 
nearly sole responsibility for public education in the city.71   
After 1824, the state school funding statute expressly 
provided that no public money would go to support sectarian 
religious organizations—but the term “sectarian” was widely 
understood as referring only to the practices of specific religious 
denominations.72  By contrast, the Society operated its schools on 
a nonsectarian basis, which meant its teachers promoted generic 
Protestant values, and encouraged general readings from the 
King James Bible and the Book of Common Prayer.73  While the 
Society saw “nonsectarianism” as religiously neutral, the policy 
plainly did not serve the interests of a growing Catholic 
 
68 Much of the material, and some of the language, in this section appeared 
originally in Ian Bartrum, The Political Origins of Secular Public Education: The 
New York School Controversy, 1840–1842, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & L. 267 (2008). 
69 Id. at 281. 
70 THOMAS BOESE, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK: ITS HISTORY, 
CONDITION, AND STATISTICS 26 (1869). 
71 Bartrum, supra note 68, at 288, 291. 
72 Id. at 283. 
73 Id. at 285. 
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minority.74  Indeed, an 1829 Pastoral Letter suggested that, in 
the common schools, “the school-boy can scarcely find a book in 
which some one or more of our institutions or practices is not 
exhibited far otherwise than it really is, and greatly to our 
disadvantage:  the entire system of education is thus tinged 
throughout its whole course.”75  The influx of Catholic 
immigrants continued, however, and in 1839 Governor William 
Seward recognized that the Society’s religious biases were 
alienating an unacceptable number of the city’s children.76  He 
therefore recommended that the legislature establish “schools in 
which [Catholics] may be instructed by teachers speaking the 
same language with themselves, and professing the same faith.”77 
New York City Catholics, under the leadership of Bishop 
John Hughes, quickly seized the political opportunity to petition 
the city’s Common Council (the “Council”) for a share of the state 
education funds.78  The Society vigorously opposed the Catholic 
petition, and, not surprisingly, the Council rejected the 
application.79  Undaunted, Bishop Hughes presented the Council 
with a second petition, this time detailing the Catholics’ specific 
objections to the Society’s Protestant readings and practices.80  
After a widely publicized two-day debate between Hughes and 
the Society’s lawyers—during which vast crowds choked the 
rooms and corridors of City Hall—the Council again rejected the 
Catholic petition.81  But Bishop Hughes remained hopeful, and 
told his congregation “we have an appeal to a higher power than 
the Common Council—to the Legislature of the State . . . .  [A]nd  
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Id. at 284–85.  
75 First Provincial Council of Baltimore, Pastoral Letter to the Laity (Oct. 17, 
1829), reprinted in PETER GUILDAY, THE NATIONAL PASTORALS OF THE AMERICAN 
HIERARCHY (1792–1919) 19, 28 (1954). 
76 Bartrum, supra note 68, at 297–99. 
77 William Seward, Annual Message to the Legislature (1840), reprinted in THE 
LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS WORKS 212, 212–13 
(George Baker ed., 1855). 
78 Bartrum, supra note 68, at 299. 
79 Id. at 301. 
80 Id. at 303. 
81 Id. at 303–05. 
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though a whole Board should be found to bend the knee to the 
Baal of bigotry, men will be found who can stand unawed in its 
presence . . . .”82 
After Secretary of State John Spencer issued a scathing 
report based on his study of the New York City public schools, 
the State Assembly took up a reform bill entitled “An Act to 
Extend the Benefits of Common School Education in the City of 
New York.”83  But the Society still had enough political muscle to 
get the bill tabled for the remainder of the 1841 session, which 
development distressed Hughes enough that he decided to take 
direct political action.84  During the postponement, a statewide 
election was held in which the city’s two senate and thirteen 
assembly seats were up for grabs.85  At a meeting just days before 
the election, Hughes presented Catholics with his own hand-
picked slate of acceptable candidates—a slate that opponents 
would derisively label the “Church and State Party”—and 
exhorted an excited crowd:  
You have often voted for others and they did not vote for you, 
but now you are determined to uphold with your own votes your  
own rights.  Will you then stand by the rights of your offspring, 
who have so long suffered under the operation of this injurious 
system?   
[Loud cheering]  Will you adhere to the nomination made? 
We will! We will!  
Will you be united? 
[Standing ovation] 
Will you let all men see that you are worthy sons of the nation 
to which you belong? 
Never fear—we will!  We will till death!   
Will you prove yourselves worthy of friends?   
[Loud cheering]   
Will none of you flinch?   
[Indescribable excitement].86 
 
 
82 John Hughes, Address to a Meeting in Washington Hall (Feb. 11, 1841), 
reprinted in 1 COMPLETE WORKS OF JOHN HUGHES, 242, 244–45 (Lawrence Kehoe 
ed., 1866). 
83 Bartrum, supra note 68, at 310–13. 
84 Id. at 313–15. 
85 Id. at 313–14. 
86 JOHN R. G. HASSARD, LIFE OF THE MOST REVEREND JOHN HUGHES, D. D., 
FIRST ARCHBISHOP OF NEW YORK 245 (1866). 
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Hughes would never quite live down his political 
maneuvering on this day.  Indeed, it earned him the nickname 
“the political bishop” from New York Herald editor James Gordon 
Bennett.  But, the prospect of a unified Catholic vote struck fear 
in the hearts of the city democrats, and ultimately shaped the 
debate to come in Albany.87 
Although the state legislature eventually passed a law 
centralizing education administration in the city—thus  
bringing down the Society—it was in many ways a hollow victory 
for the Catholics.88  Despite John Spencer’s recommendation that 
the state set up localized community school districts that could 
decide for themselves what religious messages they wanted in 
particular classrooms, the final law expressly banned “sectarian” 
teaching in public schools.89  As a result, Catholics would still 
have to surrender their children to Protestant nonsectarian 
schools, and eventually nonsectarianism would give way to 
secularism.90  Hughes would spend his later years lamenting 
public education’s descent into “godlessness,” and, after the Civil 
War, the American Catholic Hierarchy began to make plans for a 
comprehensive network of independent, privately-funded 
Catholic schools.91  It is thus the perhaps ironic legacy of “the  
political bishop” and his “Church and State Party” that they were 
unwitting allies in the coming movement to drive religion 
entirely out of public schooling.  As Vincent Lannie has observed: 
As a result [of the school controversy], many Catholic authors 
have honored Hughes as the father of Catholic education in 
America.  If this be so, then it is paradoxical that the father of 
American Catholic education should also have acted as the 
catalyst in the eventual secularization of American public 
education.92 
But the preservation of nonsectarianism was a temporary 
victory for the Protestants, too.  Though they had succeeded  
in defeating Catholic hopes for public school money, their 
arguments about the need for religious neutrality would 
 
87 Bartrum, supra note 68, at 314 & n.271, 315. 
88 Id. at 318–19. 
89 Id. at 317. 
90 Id. at 319. 
91 Id. 
92 VINCENT P. LANNIE, PUBLIC MONEY AND PAROCHIAL EDUCATION: BISHOP 
HUGHES, GOVERNOR SEWARD, AND THE NEW YORK SCHOOL CONTROVERSY 258 
(1968). 
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eventually prove too much.  The same arguments that excluded 
Catholic educational practices would eventually exclude the  
King James Bible and the Book of Common Prayer as well,  
and so it may be interesting to realize that those Protestant  
communities that complain most aggressively about secular 
schools today are, in a historical sense, hoist on their own 
petard.93 
And so, even though it took time to reach fruition, the 
injection of nonpublic reasons into both sides of the political 
debate over the New York City schools would eventually bring  
us greater clarity about the ways that our educational system 
should reflect our democratic ideals.  The threat of a unified 
Catholic vote was a shock to the state political system; one  
that forced both sides of the debate to recognize and take 
responsibility for an evolving conception of religious freedom  
and neutrality.94  Indeed, it was in building and refining a set  
of public reasons to oppose the Catholic petitions that the 
Protestant majority began to identify and construct the values 
and rationales that would ultimately lead to secular public 
education on a nationwide basis.  In this sense, the “Church and 
State Party” provided the kind of jolt—the political mutation or 
anomaly—that would eventually lead to a paradigm changing 
political insight.  And in this way, hopefully the New York City 
school controversy provides a useful example of a circumstance in 
which nonpublic reasoning played a critical role in producing 
political results that we might believe are a better reflection of 
our American democratic ideals. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that John Rawls’s so-called “duty of 
civility,” which obligates us to deliberate and cast our votes for 
“public reasons,” probably is framed in deontological language 
because it is intended to compete with the other deontological 
kinds of reasons—religious duties—that seem to support the 
constitutional protection of free religious exercise.  Despite  
the styling, however, Rawls’s argument for excluding  
nonpublic reasons from political discourse actually sounds in 
consequentalism; essentially he believes that allowing only public 
 
93 Bartrum, supra note 68, at 320. 
94 Id. at 320–21. 
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reasons to enter our political deliberations is the best way to 
produce rational, and thus legitimate, exercises of democratic 
political authority.  When we recognize that Rawls’s argument on 
this point is actually consequentalist in nature, it becomes 
necessary to challenge his account on its own grounds—with a 
competing consequentalist account. 
This Article suggests that nonpublic reasons can provide the 
kind of fundamental ideological diversity necessary to catalyze 
moments of deep political innovation.  In making this argument, 
this Article draws two imperfect analogies to the world of science.  
The first is to Thomas Kuhn’s conception of scientific revolutions 
grounded in paradigm changing insights.  These insights are not 
available within the existing paradigms of scientific inquiry, and 
thus depend upon a fundamental reordering of scientific norms.  
Nonpublic reasons may serve this purpose in political science, 
and we should therefore protect their place in our discussions 
precisely because they represent ideas that we could not explain 
in terms of the existing paradigm of political values.  The second 
analogy is to the theory of natural selection and punctuated 
equilibria.  Nonpublic reasons may also act in the way that 
“mutations” do in the evolution of species.  That is, they can 
provide nonlinear kinds of change, which an evolving 
environment may select for or against.  Because these 
“mutations” only manage to produce real adaptations when such 
changes suit the shifting democratic environment, the danger 
they present to political stability is minimal.  When such a 
mutation does match up with an important change in 
environment, however, its value is so great that we need to 
account for and protect its place in our political discourse at all 
times. 
Finally, this Article presents the New York City Catholic 
school controversy as a historical and anecdotal illustration of a 
productive interaction between public and nonpublic reasoning.  
The injection of nonpublic reasons into the debate over public 
education in the 1840s presented such a shock to the political 
system that it forced us to refine and reconstruct the kinds of 
public reasoning that might bring us closer to our democratic 
ideals.  It was, in other words, in coming to terms with the 
nonpublic reasons forwarded in the Catholic school debate that 
we began to recognize the ways that our existing political value 
structure was out of line with our larger ideals.  And, if we are 
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going to argue in consequentalist terms, this is precisely why we 
should protect and value nonpublic reasons in our political 
discourse.  They can bring about moments of real political 
honesty and inspire the kind of deep democratic creativity that 
may bring our overlapping consensus of political values into 
closer focus.  Most importantly, they may inspire conversations 
that ultimately bring our political realities into better alignment 
with our democratic ideals. 
